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A STUDY OF THE STATUTES WHICH CONTAIN
THE TERM "SUBJECT OF THE ACTION"
AND WHICH RELATE TO JOINDER
OF ACTIONS AND PLAINTIFFS
AND TO COUNTERCLAIMS
CARL C. WHEATON*
On various occasions I have spoken to lawyers in what are ordina-
rily called common law states concerning pleading statutes. Almost
without exception they have said they felt fortunate that they
were not practicing or acting as judges in a code state. Whether
or not their attitude was a wise one I shall not attempt to say,
but when one reads the material, including judicial decisions, which
has been written concerning the subjects covered by this study,
he cannot wonder at the tenacity with which some lawyers in non-
code states cling to their procedural system.
I shall confine this article almost entirely to a discussion of joinder
of actions and counterclaims which are permitted under what is so
often called the "transaction clause" of the joinder of actions and
counterclaim statutes, and to joinder of plaintiffs who have an
interest in the same subject of the action and in the relief requested.
I wish first to present the various types of statutes relating to
these subjects, then to state with thoroughness the non-statutory
law dealing therewith, following that to analyze those court decisions
and unofficial writings, and finally, with much humility, but with
conviction, to state my personal views as to what the proper results
should be.
Knowing that I am treading on ground which I should, perhaps,
if wiser, leave unexplored, I shall now proceed to the very substance
of the discussion.
THE STATUTES
We find the following types of statutes. First, then, as to those
dealing with joinder of actions:
"The plaintiff may unite in the same petition several causes
of action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denom-
inated legal or equitable, or both, where they all arise out of:
First, the same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action * * *" 1
*Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
'Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 765. Statutes, almost, or quite, similar are CONN.
GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1930) § 5512; MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9277; NEB. COMP.
STAT. (1929) § 20-701; N. M. ANN. STAT. (Comp. 1929) C. 105, § 4o6; N. Y. C. P.
20
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This is the most prevalent statute. One should notice with care
the differences appearing in those which follow this one.
"The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same
complaint where they all arise out of :* * * * *
8. Claims arising out of the same transaction, or transactions
connected with the same subject of action, * * * * * -2
Here there is no express statement that the actions joined may
be legal or equitable or both.
"All actions ex delicto may be joined in the same suit, and
may be joined with actions ex contractu, arising out of the same
transaction or relating to the same subject matter, * * * * * -4
"The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same
complaint when they all arise out of * * * * * *
Eighth. The same transaction. * * * * * 
''
The change in this enactment is important for the subject of action
is not mentioned.
In addition to these code provisions one should be cognizant of
certain others so that he may know of the different developments
in this general field. Especially is it important to be familiar with
the Kentucky, New Jersey, and English rules, for from them, shadows,
let us hope, of coming events, one gets a splendid idea of the pos-
sibilities of joinder of actions. Knowledge of them may give us
an inspiration to aid in throwing off the shackles of early code
provisions still extremely virile and, apparently, confusing. I
give them in full as far as they are valuable to this discussion.
"A pleading may contain statements of as many causes of
action, legal or equitable, ***** as there may be grounds for
in behalf of the pleader."'
"Subject to rules, the plaintiff may join any causes of action."'7
A. (1920) § 258; N. C. CODE (1931) § 507; N. D. Coup. LAWS (1913) § 7466;
OHIO GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, Baldwin's Rev. I93O) § 113o6; OKLA. CoMP.
STAT. (1921) § 266; S. C. CODE (1932) (Code of Civ. Proc.) § 487; S. D. Coup.
LAWS (1929) § 2371; UTAH COMe. LAWS (1917) § 6567; Wyo. REV. STAT. (i93i)
§ 89-6Ol.2C. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 427. Statutes almost, or quite,
similar are HAWAII REV. LAWS (1925) § 2366; NEV. CoMe. LAws (1929) § 8595
(§ 97 of CV. PRAc. ACT); ORE. LAWS (1930) § 6-114.
4ALA. CODE (1928) § 9467.
5Alaska Sess. Laws 1923 pp. 18-19; WASH. Comp. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 296.
6KY. CIV. PRAC. CODE (Carroll, 1927) § 113 (2).
7N. J. Coup. STAT. (CUM. Supp. 1911-1924, Prac. Act 1912) § 163-287. Rule
14 of Rules of Court under the Practice Act (1912) reads as follows:
(a) In actions for the recovery of lands, no cause of action shall be joined
(without leave of court) except for mesne profits, or damages for breach of any
contract under which the property, or any part thereof, was held or for injury
to the property.
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"Subject to the following Rules of this Order, the plaintiff
may unite in the same action several causes of action, but if it
appear to the Court or a judge that any such causes of action
cannot be conveniently tried or disposed of together the court
or judge may order separate trials of any of such causes of
action to be had, or may make such other order, as may be
necessary or expedient for the separate disposal thereof." s
And then let us peruse other variations of this in the United
States. In Kansas "the plaintiff may unite several causes of action
in the same petition, whether they be such as have been heretofore
denominated legal or equitable, or both, but the causes of action
so united must affect all the parties to the action, except in actions
to enforce mortgages or other liens." 9
In Colorado this result is reached as to "all actions sounding only
in damages, whether the same be for breach of contract, sealed or
parol, express or implied, or for injuries to property, person, or
character, or for any two or more of these causes, * * * * * ,"0
In Florida "causes of action of whatever kind by and against the
same parties in the same right may be joined in the same suit, except
that replevin and ejectment shall not be joined together, nor with
other causes of action."'"
(b) Claims by a trustee in bankruptcy, as such, must not, except by leave
of court, be joined with any claim by him in any other capacity.
(c) Claims by or against any executor or administrator, as such, must not
(without leave of court) be joined with claims by or against him personally,
unless the latter claims arose with reference to the estate of his testator or in-
testate.
(d) Claims by plaintiffs jointly, may be joined with claims by them, or any
of them, separately against the same defendant.
(e) Claims by or against husband and wife may be joined with claims by
or against either of them separately.
(f) The court may strike out causes of action which can not be conveniently
tried with other causes of action joined in the same suit.
Rules of Sup. Ct. Eng. Order XVIII, Rule i, (1896). Rules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and
8 and 9 taken together are substantially like subdivisions a, b, e, c, d, and f
respectively of Rule 14 under the New Jersey Practice Act (1912), though
rule 2 contains a provision for an order for delivery of the property to the plain-
tiff involved in a foreclosure action or to the defendant in a redemption procedure
which wording is not found in the New Jersey law. It was added by Rules
of December, x885. Rule 8 provides that the defendant may apply to the court
to confine the action to causes which can be conveniently disposed of together.
This refinement is not found in the New Jersey law.
9KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 6o-6oi. Wisconsin has practically the same
statute, except that it does not make the exception as to liens, and the causes
joined must not require different places of trial. WIs. STAT. (1929) c. 263, § 4.
10COLO. CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1921) § 76.
nFLA. Comp. LAWS (1927) § 4225.
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In Iowa "causes of action of whatever kind, where each may be
prosecuted by the same kind of proceedings, if held by the same party,
and against the same party, in the same rights, and if action on
all may be brought and tried in that county, may be joined in the
same petition."12
In Michigan, "the plaintiff may join in one action, at law or in
equity, as many causes of action as he may have against defendant,
but legal and equitable causes shall not be joiited; * * ** *". It is further
provided that multiple plaintiffs and defendants must have joint
interest, and the court may order separate trials.1
Itis in ordernowto investigate the terms of the counterclaim statutes
"The counterclaim must be an existing one in favor of a
defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several
judgment might be had in the action, and must be a cause of
action arising out of the contract or transaction pleaded in the
complaint, or connected with the subject of the action."'4
This is the greatly favored enactment. Mark that in this instance
the counterclaim may be by one of many defendants against one
of several plaintiffs, and may arise out of either the contract or the
transaction pleaded by the plaintiff.
Here follow other code provisions patterned along this line, yet
with distinct differences.
In Oregon and Alaska (in the former state, but not in the latter,
reference is made only to law actions) the counterclaim must be
one existing in favor of the not a defendant, but may be against
a plaintiff.'" But in Montana and New York the counterclaim
may be against the plaintiff, or, in a proper case, against the person
whom he represents, and in favor of the defendant, or of -one or more
defendants.'
The act in Kentucky states that a defendant may counterclaim
a cause which he has against a plaintiff or against him and another.'7
1IOWA CODE (1931) § 1O960. For another statute almost as broad, see 4a
REv. CODE OF PRAC. (Dart. 1932) Arts. 148-150.
'MicH. CoMp. LAWS (1929) c. 266, § 13962.
'
4Aiuz. REV. CODE (1928) § 3785; IOWA CODE (1931) § 11151; KAN. REV.
STAT. ANN. (1923) § 6o-7II; MiNN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 9254; Mo. REv.
STAT. (1929) § 777; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) § 20-813; N. M. ANN. STAT. (1929)
c. 105, § 417; N. C. CODE (1931) § 521; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 7449;
OKLA. COMP. STAT. (1921) § 274; S. C. CODE (1932) § 468; S. D. Comp. LAWS
(1929) § 2354; WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 265; Wis. STAT. (1929)
c. 263, § 14; Wyo. REv. STAT. (i931) § 89-106.
"5ALASKA CoMP. LAWS (1913) § 896; ORE. LAWS (1930) § x-6ii.
16MONT. REV. CODE (1921) § 9138; N. Y. C. P. AcT (1920) § 266.
"7KY. CIv. PRAC. CODE (Carroll, 1927) § 96 (1).
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Ohio provides that the counterclaim may be an action existing
in favor of a defendant against a plaintiff or another defendant,
or both.1
8
We next turn to a set of statutes which appears to be basically
different from the preceding statutes, for these enactments now
to be considered all provide that the counterclaim must arise out
of the transaction, not the contract or transaction set forth. in the
plaintiff's original pleading.19 This difference in w6rding has, how-
ever, ordinarily not seemed important to the courts.
It should further be observed as to these acts last mentioned that
in Nevada20 the counterclaim must be in favor of the defendant and
against a plaintiff, and in Colorado2 1 the claim shall be one existing
in favor of the defendant or plaintiff and against a plaintiff or defendant.
In Indiana "a counterclaim is any matter arising out of or con-
nected with the cause of action which might be the subject of an
action in favor of the defendant, or which would tend to reduce the
plaintiff's claim or demand for damages"." The Texas act, though
worded a little differently, is to the same effect.- This is likewise
true in Tennessee," the peculiar words being that the defendant
may plead by way of cross action any matter arising out of the
plaintiff's "demand".
Florida has an unusual statute which deals only with equity
cases. It provides that the counterclaim must be pleaded, and
defines it as a claim in favor of the defendant arising out of the
transaction which is the subject matter of the suit (note that transac-
tion and subject matter of the suit seem to be treated as identical)
against the plaintiff.2
5
This closes the .list of acts which definitely suggest that there
must be some connection between the counterclaim and the contract,
transaction, cause of action, or subject of the action pleaded by the
plaintiff with but one exception which, because of its hybrid nature,
will be mentioned later. What other paths have been opened up
in counterclaim statutes will next claim our attention.
18OHIo GEN. CODE (Throckmorton, Baldwin's Rev. 1930) § 11317.
"CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 438; COLO. CODE CIV. PROC. (1921)
§ 63; IDAHO COMP. STAT. (I919) § 6695; NEV. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 8603; UTAH
Comp. LAWS (1917) § 6576.
20NEV. ComP. LAWS (1929) § 8603.
21COLO. CODE CIV. PROC. (1921) § 63.
22IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, Watson's Rev. 1926) § 373.
23TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925) Art. 2017.
24TENN. CODE (1932) § 8768 (2).
25FLA. DIG. LAWS (Bush's, 1872) § IO.
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Arkansas has opened the gates almost full width to defendants
in allowing a counterclaim to be "any cause of action in favor of
the defendants, or some of them, against the plaintiffs, or some of
them". 2
New Jersey varies the Arkansas rule by confining the counterclaim
to causes of action held by the defendant, but by allowing the defend-
ant to issue a summons against any third party necessary to be
brought in.
2 7
Connecticut also allows the counterclaim to be of any type, but
it must be in favor of the defendant, and against the plaintiff.28
The hybrid statute which has been previously mentioned is that
of Louisiana. It declares that usually the reconvention (counter-
claim29) must be a demand of the defendant against the plaintiff
which is necessarily connected with and identical to the plaintiff's
action, but if the plaintiff resides out of the state, or in the state,
but in a different parish from the defendant, the demand of the
defendant may be any cause even though it is not necessarily con-
nected with or incidental to the main cause of action." Here we
find a combination of the type of statute demanding some connec-
tion between the main cause of action and counterclaim and the
style of legislation with no such requirement.
The last group of statutes to be presented is that relating to the
joinder of plaintiffs. Here there is a slavish following of the work
of prior legislatures which is indeed mystifying, when one con-
siders the variety of interpretations that has been givea the almost,
but not quite, universal statute, which is here quoted.
"All persons having an interest in the subject of the action,
and in obtaining the relief ("judgment" in Connecticut) de-
manded, may be joined as plaintiffs except as otherwise
provided."31
26ARK. DIG. STAT. (1921) § 1195.
27N. J. CoMP. STAT. (Cum. Supp. 1911-1924) § 163-288, Counterclaim § 12.
2 8 CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 193o) § 5511.
29McLeod v. Bertschy, 33 Wis. 176, 14 Am. Rep. 755 (1873).
30LA. CODE OF PRAC. (Dart., 1932) Art. 375.
3 ALASKA COwiP. LAWS (1913) § 870; ARK. DIG. STAT. (1921) § 1095; COLO.
ComfP. LAWS, CODE OF CIV. PROC. (1921) § 10; CONN. GEN. STAT. (Rev. 1930)
§ 5516; FLA. DIG. LAWS (Bush's, 1872) § 68, but not in later revisions of the
statutes; IOWA CODE (1931) § 10969; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 60-410;
ICY. CIV. PRAC. CODE (Carroll, 1927) § 22; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 700; MONT.
REV. CODES (1921) § 9077; NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) § 20-311; Nev. Comp.
LAWS (1929) § 8555 (Civ. Prac. Act, § 56); N. M. ANN. STAT. (1929) C. 105,
§ 1O5; N. D. Comp. LAWS ANN. (1913) § 7403; OHIO GEN. CODE (Throckmorton,
Baldwin's Rev. 1930) § 11254; OKLA. CoiPm. STAT. ANN. (1921) § 218; Ore. Laws
1930 § 6-105; S. C. CODE (1932) Vol. I, Code of Civ. Proc., § 403; S. D. ComnP.
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There are four other laws relating to joinder of plaintiffs, those of
California, New Jersey, New York, and Washington which seem to
have been born of a broader vision than those just delineated, and
which appear to have back of them a purpose to be more definite and
clear. Their attempt is surely not a complete triumph, but how
successful they have been in attaining breadth and clarity can only
be ascertained by reading the enactments, so I present them here
as examples of the results of a new school of procedural philosophy.
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs who
have an interest in the subject of the action or in whom any
right to relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction
or series of transactions is alleged to exist, whether jointly,
severally or in the alternative, where if such persons brought
separate actions any question of law or fact would arise which
are common to all the parties to the action," and provision is
made for separate trials, if, upon motion of any party, it appears
that the joinder would embarrass or delay the trial. 2
"Subject to rules, all persons claiming an interest in the
subject of the action and in obtaining the judgment demanded
either jointly, severally or in the alternative, may join as plain-
tiffs, except as otherwise provided. And persons interested
in separate causes of action may join if the causes have a com-
mon question of law or fact and arose out of the same transac-
tion or series of transactions."n3
"All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs, in
whom any right to relief in resect of or arising out of the
same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist
whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, where if such
persons brought separate actions any common question of
law or fact would arise," and the same provision is then made
as in the California Code for a separation of the parties and their
actions, if their joinder would embarrass or delay the trial.u
To complete the story of these statutes relating to the joinder
of plaintiffs one must not fail to notice that in Indiana35 the law
LAWS (1929) § 2313; UTAH CoMp. LAWS (1917) § 6506; Wis. STAT. (1929) C. 260,
§ io; Wyo. REv. STAT. ANN. (1931) § 89-513. In Michigan the same statute
is given, but is applied only to equitable actions, MIcH. Comp. LAWS (1929)
§ 14o18. There is a slight variation in N. C. CODE (1931) § 455 in that it provides
that if, upon the application of any party, it shall appear that the joinder may
embarrass or delay the trial, the court may order separate trials -or make such
other order as may be expedient.
32CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. (Deering, 1931) § 378.
33N. J. CoMP. STAT. (CuM. Supp. 1911-1924), (Prac. Act of 1912) § 163-28o.
34N. Y. C. P. A. as amended by the Laws of 1920, C. 925, § 209; subdivision 1,
rule I--of Rules of Pleading, Procedure, and Practice in Trial Courts, I4O Wash.
p. xxxv.
35IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns 1926) § 270.
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which is of the usual tenor in most respects is unparalleled in its
making joinder imperative whenever a joinder is possible.
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTES BY THE AUTHORITIES
In this division of our study we must be prepared not to expect
any consensus of opinion on most of the vitally important questions
involved. If we hunt long enough, we will find an opinion in favor
of almost any view. Again, we must not anticipate finding numerous
well reasoned judicial decisions. There is a surprising paucity of
them, but now and then we will find a real gem. With this warning,
let us commence our investigation.
One of the basic rules of interpretation of statutes is that the
legislative intent should be determined. This has been the method
of attack by many courts and by other writers. This interpretive
test is applied to the first parts of the statutes under discussion,
which portion of the acts presents the question as to whether or
not the joinders and pleading of counterclaims are permissive or
mandatory. The word "may" is used in all but a few36 of the laws
now under consideration, and the courts have thought that this
indicates permissive, rather than mandatory, statutes.37
Though the same standard of the lawmakers' intent has been
applied to the explanation of the other parts of the enactments
under discussion, it is enunciated in a variety of formulas. That
is, instead of stating that one should look to the legislature's intent,
many cases explain, rather, what that intent is.
The broadest and least involved assertion of this type is that
equity should be looked to in interpreting these statutes.38 Ordinarily
this conclusion is not supported by cited authorities. The most
36INp.. ANN. STAT. (BuMS, 1926), which says proper plaintiffs must join.
a
7Bruce v. Kelly, 5 Hun 229 (1875); Gregory v. Hobbs, 93 N. C. i (1885);
John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N. C. 22 (1885).
38Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C. 3o3 (i886); CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) p. 252,
referring to FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEAD-
INGS (1848) 124; KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) p. 324; POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 113; TILLINGHAST AND SHEARMAN, PRACTICE
PLEADING, AND FORMS (1870) pp. 471-473; WORKS, PRACTICE, PLEADING,
AND FORMS (1882) § 97. In effect, SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917)
§ 17, has the same idea when he says that only those who could join in equity
can join under the code, as did the court in Sherlock v. Manwaren, 208 App.
Div. 538, 203 N. Y. Supp. 709 (4th Dept. 1923). Another writer in (1924) 2
N. Y. L. R!v. at p. 369 stated that the language "upon claims arising out of
the same transaction connected with the same subject of the action" was no
innovation in pleading, but was used in equity pleading long before its intro-
duction into the codes.
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effective authority given for this result is that offered by Dean
Clarka' when he states that the framers of the original New York Code
said that in general they meant to apply equity procedure to all actions
under the code. That is truly going back to the origin of the acts.
Another very valuable indication of the purpose of the legislatures
as to how these statutes should be defined is found in many of the
acts, for they state specifically that, for instance, causes both equit-
able and legal may be joined. In other cases the language of the
statutes does not make this direct declaration, but suggests no
distinction between the two types of cases. This legislation has often
been interpreted to cover legal and equitable causes. 9
The other authorities, which, in effect, arrive at the same con-
clusion, do it by inference. They state equitable principles which
had been laid down previously as the correct test for the proper
joinder of causes or plaintiffs, or for the pleading of counterclaims.
One phrase which is used is that the terms of the statutes are com-
plied with if one connected story can be told.40 Professor Keigwin
appears to favor this test,41 and quotes Story4' as a supporting author-
ity. Much the same idea is embodied in the wordings "one course
of dealing, '" 43 and "one connected interest centering on the point
at issue in the cause or one common point of litigation".4 4
A different application of equitable principles to the problem
is made by some authorities who apply the standard of avoiding
a multiplicity of suits. 5 The same purpose is affirmed in the thought
38 See supra note 38.39Barberich v. Pooshichian, 59 Cal. App. 507, 211 Pac. 236 (1922); Blodgett
v. Trumbull, 257 Pac. 399 (Cal. Dist. Ct. of App. 1927); Henderson v. Dickey,
50 Mo. 161 (1886); Blair v. Chicago & A. R. Co., 89 Mo. 383, 1 S. W. 350 (1886);
McHoney v. German Ins. Co., 44 Mo. App. 426 (1891); Bruce v. Kelly, 5 Hun
229 (N. Y. 1875); Daniels v. Fowler, 12o N. C. 14, 26 S. E. 635 (1897); Tootle v.
Kent, 12 Okla. 674, 73 Pac. 310 (19o3); McArthur v. Moffett, z43 Wis. 564,
128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264 (1910); XKEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEAD-
ING (1926) p. 321; KINNE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (1888) § 54; POMEROY,
CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. z929) § 369; 2 TILLINGHAST AND SHEARMAN, Op. Cit.
supra note 38, pp. 136 et seg. But see a contrary suggestion in Shelton v. Harri-
son, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914).
40Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C. (5 Ired. Eq. Rep.) 313 (1848); Young v. Young,
81 N. C. 91 (1879); Heggie v. Hill, 95 N. C. 303 (1886).
41KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) pp. 437 et seg.
42SToRY, EQUITY PLEADING (loth ed. 1892) § 272.
43Marshville Cotton Mills v. Maslin, 195 N. C. 12, 141 S. E. 348 (1928).
"Doyle v. American Wringer Co., 60 App. Div. 525, 69 N. Y. Supp. 952
(2nd Dept. 19o).
"5Story and Isham Commercial Co. v. Story, loo Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671 (1893);
Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 40 Ind. App. 26, 80 N. B. 981 (1907); Mul-
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that the policy of the courts of equity is to dispose of the whole subject
of a controversy in one proceeding.46
The important principle that these laws are to be interpreted in
the light of equity jurisprudence seems settled, though, as usual,
there are scattered opinions the other way, which will appear as we
proceed.
Our next task is to determine just what explanation has been
made of the statutes involved in this discussion, and especially to
note the extent to which equitable principles have in fact been ap-
plied in the process.
As will be recalled, both the joinder of actions and counterclaim
acts use the term "transaction". The former allows a joinder if
the claims "arise out of the same transaction or transactions con-
nected with the same subject of the action", and the latter allows
one to counterclaim a cause of action "arising out of the contract48
or transaction pleaded by the plaintiff."
It has been said that these statutes should not be defined, for
they have been purposely made comprehensive in their terms. Some-
times this doctrine is stated in definite words like those preceding, 49
and, at others, the sam6 conception has been suggested by expres-
sions to the effect that the statute is properly obscure so that inter-
•pretations of its terms may be made which are most convenient
and best calculated to promote the ends of justice. 0
One soon learns, however, that most writers believe the terms in
these enactments should be defined. Sometimes we find clear
cahy v. Duggan, 67 Mont. 9, 214 Pac. 1io6 (1923); Stark County v. Mischel,
33 N. D. 432, 156 N. W. 931 (1916); Advance Thresher Co. v. Klein, 28 S. D.
177, 133 N. W. 51, L. R. A. 1916C, 514 (IgII); Atkinson v. Jackson Bros.,
259 S. W. 280 (Civ. App. Tex. 1923); Warner v. Gohiman, Lester & Co., 298
S. W. 89o (Civ. App. Tex. 1927); (1925) 3 N. Y. L. Rev. 429.
6Newport v. Hatton, 195 Cal. 132, 231 Pac. 987 (1924); Morris v. Judkins,
36 Cal. App. 413, 172 Pac. 163 (x918); Hamlin v. Tucker, 72 N. C. 502 (1875);
KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) p. 329.
471n some statutes a comma follows "transaction".
48in a few statutes "contract or" is omitted.
49Price v. Kobacker Furniture Co., 20 Ohio App. 464, 152 N. E. 301 (1926);
PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (1896) § 196; SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-
1917) § 19.
5 Sims v. Spelman, 209 Mo. App. 186, 232 S. W. 1071 (1921); Holmes v.
Abbott, 53 Hun 943, 6 N. Y. Supp. 943 (1889); Barkley v. Williams, 30 Misc.
687, 64 N. Y. Supp. 318 (Sup. Ct. 19oo); Hawk v. Pine Lumber Co., 145 N. C.
48, 58 S. E. 603 (1907); N. Y. and N. H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592,
603-609, 7 Abb. Pr. 41, 65-70 (1858); KINKEAD, LAW IN CIVIL ACTIONS AND
DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2nd ed. 1898) § 23; (1924) 2 N. Y. L. REV. 366,
(1925) 3 id. 429.
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statements that this should be done liberally,"1 since they deal with
remedies. Just how well this proposition is carried out we shall
now discover.
In commencing the business of defining "transaction", may we
not logically look to its derivation? All authorities say it comes
from the Latin words "trans" and "agere".62 Translated, it means
"to carry on"." It is further said that "the notion of completed
action strongly characterized the word in the Latin language, from
which, through the Normans, we derived it, although we gain little
assistance otherwise from these sources in determining its meaning,
since both the Romans and the French have used it mainly as a
juridical term to signify an agreement of parties in settlement of
differences. Dig. II. i5, 'De Transactionibus'; Civil Code of Frace,
art. 2 04 4 ."M
Little light do we gather from an etymological study, so let us
proceed to definitions. Although one finds explanations of "transac-
tion" in the legal dictionaries, 5 they contain no original thought
and are not, therefore, of interest to us. We shall, rather, examine
the conclusions of the other non-judicial writers and the courts.
If, as some say,6 the word under review is a term from the common
speech of men, it is worth our while to consult non-legal dictionaries
for its meaning. They say that a transaction is "an affair;57 that
which is done or in the process of being done;5s the doing or perform-
5tBlodgett v. Trumbull, 257 Pac. 199 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927); Craft Refriger-
ating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 Atl. 76, 25 L. R. A.
856 (1893); First Say. Bank of Pocatello v. Sherman, 33 Idaho 343, 195 Pac.
630 (1920); Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Benson, 114 Minn. 92, 13o N. W. I (i91I);
Northwestern Port Huron Co. v. Iverson, 22 S. D. 314, 117 N. W. 372, 133
Am. St. Rep. 920 (19o8); Gray v. Granger, 48 Wash. 442, 93 Pac. 912 (19o8);
McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445,33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264 (1910);
BOONE, CODE PLEADING (1885) § 87.
'Craft Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551,
29 Atl. 76, 25 L. R. A. 856 (1893); Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 40 Ind.
App. 26 (1907); BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61.
53Excesior Clay Works v. DeCamp, supra note 52.
"Craft Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiae Brewing Co., supra note 52.
-ANDERSON; BALLENTINE; BLACK; BOUVIER.
"Craft Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551,
29 Atl, 76, 25 L. R. A. 856 (1893); Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536, 139 Pac.
454, L. R. A. x916C 491 (1914); PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (1896) § 196; McCas-
kill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614, 646; (1929) 2 SO.
CALIF. L. REv. 3x5.
57WEBSTER's NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY; THE NEW CENTURY Dic-
TIONARY; NUTTALL'S STANDARD PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY.
58WEBSTER; CENTURY (in effect); MURRAY'S NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY (in
effect).
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ing of any affair;5 9 or business; 0 a piece of business;6' the act of
transacting or conducting any business, negotiation, management,
a proceeding. '" 62
It is clear that most courts do treat transaction as a non-technical
term, but we shall see as we go along that this is not the universal
holding. It will be interesting to note how nearly the dictionary
definitions quoted above coincide with those of lawyers.
Delving into the conceptions of lawyers on the meaning of "trans-
action", we find them stating their results in both negative and
affirmative terms. It has been asserted that transaction is not
synonymous with accident or occurrence,6' or contract, it being broader
than this last mentioned term.4 Neither, it is claimed, is it synon-
ymous with cause of action or subject of action, it being more extensive
than these expressions, for out of it the defendant's cause of action
is said to arise, and it is also to be set forth in the complaint or peti-
tion not as the cause of action but as the transaction.6 There are
several direct claims that it applies to contract and tort conceptions
in both the joinder of actions66 and counterclaim 7 sections. A number




tCENTURY; MURRAY'S NEW OXFORD DICTIONARY.
6WORCESTER.
Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 4o Ind. App. 26, 8o N. E. 981 (1907);
Lake Shore and M. S. Ry. Co. v. Van Auken, I Ind. App. 492, 27 N. E. I19
(1891).
6 Bannerot v. McClure, 39 Colo. 472, 90 Pac. 70, 12 L. R. A. (N. s.) 126 (1907);
Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372 (N. Y. 1858); Chance v. Carter, 81
Ore. 229, 158 Pac. 947 (1916); BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 6I; PHIL-
LIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) § 376; SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (I910-
1917) § 633. Perhaps Rogers v. Wheeler, 89 App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Supp. 981
(2nd Dept. 19o3); Rooker v. Bruce, 45 Ind. App. 57, 9o N. E. 86 (igog) are contra.
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §§ 367 and 368 is also not in accord,
if one considers the ordinary meaning of its language, but later passages are
the other way.
6
'POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 650.
"
6Mayberry v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., oo Minn. 79, 1 io N. W. 356, 12 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 675, io ANN. CAS. 754 (1907).
67Scott v. Waggoner, 48 Mont. 536, 139 Pac. 454, L. R. A. 1916C 491 (1914);
Gross v. Hochstim, 72 Misc. 343, 13o N. Y. Supp. 315 (Sup. Ct., App. Term
1911); Fort Worth Lead and Zinc Co. v. Robinson, 89 Okla. 221, 215 Pac. 205
(1923); Guy Harris Buick Co. v. Bryant, io8 Okla. 117, 233 Pac. 752 (1925);
PATTISON, MISSOURI CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1912) § 751; POMEROY, CODE
REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 613. Notice the suggestion that a contract claim
could not be part of a tort transaction. Ellison v. Young, 71 Colo. 385, 206 Pac.
802 (1922).
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any occurrence between parties that may become the foundation
of an action. 8 In further explanation of this last idea, we learn that
it embraces everything connected with a contract from the com-
mencement of the negotiations and ending with the performance
of the contracts, 9 and, as to torts, it takes in all the facts and cir-
cumstances out of which the injury complained of arose.7 0 Yet
narrower tendencies are found, some saying that a contract transac-
tion only includes the proceedings resulting in an agreement,"
while still another has concluded that each distinct infringement
of some primary right is a transaction. 2 Dean Clark treats a trans-
action as the facts of an affair or dealings between parties and says
it should "be limited only where, and to the extent that, expediency
of trial in the particular case outweighs the desirability of settling
all controversies between the litigants in the one suit."7a Professor
Gavit has defined transaction as the "factual situation."'72b We
have ascertained what phrases are distinguished from transaction,
what types of cases may be involved therein, and have obtained a
general idea of the breadth of meaning of that term.
But we have not gone far enough, for there are other principles
to consider. Of these, the one of prime importance is that dealing
with the unity of facts essential to the existence of a single transac-
tion. It is the logical relation of facts which determines whether they
together constitute a single transaction. 3 The facts constituting
a transaction must "be a unit, one affair, or else it would not be a
68Emerson v. Nash, 124 Wis. 369, 102 N. W. 921, 70 L. R. A. 326, io9 Am.
St. Rep. 944 (i9O5); BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; MCQUILLAN,
MISSOURI PRACTICE (2nd ed. 1907) § 346; SCHNEIDER, CODE PLEADING (1926)
p. 16; (1929) 2. So. CALIF. L. REV. 315.69Adams v. Bissell & Noble, 28 Barb. 382 (N. Y. 1858); GREEN AND MYER,
MISSOURI PRACTICE (1879) § 817; TIFFANY AND SIuTH, NEW YORK PRACTICE
(1864) vol. I, pp. 394-396. Panther v. McKnight, 256 Pac. 916 (Okla. 1926) and
SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 191 seem to be this inclusive, but
do not say so specifically. Deford v. Hutchinson, 45 Kan. 318, 25 Pac. 641,
II L. R. A. 257 (189i) and (1929) 2 So. CALIF. REv. p. 315 state that the con-
tract transaction only includes the proceedings resulting in an agreement.
70Reamer v. Morrison Exp. Co., 93 Mo. App. 5oi, 67 S. W. 718 (1902); Polley
v. Wilkisson, 5 Civ. Pro. R. 135 (N. Y. 1884); PATTISON, MISSOURI CODE PLEAD-
ING (2nd ed. I912) § 751; 2 TILLINGHAST AND SHEARIXAN, op. Cit. supra note 38,
pp. 68-7o.
7Deford v. Hutchinson, 45 Kan. 318, 25 Pac. 614, II L. R. A. 257 (1891);
2 So. CALIF. REV. p. 315.
72Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 96o, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1n68 (I912).
72aHANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928) pp. 451-457.
72bTIe Code Cause of Action (930) 30 COL. L. REV. 802, 823 et seq.
73Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 40 Ind. App. 26, 8o N. E. 981 (1907);
WILL'S GOULD, PLEADING (1909) note p. 394.
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single transaction; and yet it must be in its nature complex for
it must be the origin of two or more primary rights, and of the
wrongs which violate them. In order that this may be so, the facts
from which the different primary rights flow must be parts of, or
steps in, the transaction, and, for the same reason, the wrongful
acts or omissions of the defendant must be parts of the same trans-
action;"7 4 the facts composing a transaction in a contract case
must have been within the contemplation of the parties during
their dealings with each other.75
A question, both interesting and of much consequence, arises as
to the importance of the time element in determining whether or
not there is the necessary unity of facts to make them all part of one
transaction. It is most often said that the word transaction has
not a controlling time element in it,78 though the inference is that,
from the very nature of things, facts occurring at about the same
time are more likely to have some connection with each other than
those occurring at different times. In Mulcahy v. Duggan7 7 the
court went so far as to say that a libel of the defendant by the
plaintiff on May 8, 192o arose out of the same transaction as an
assault and battery of the plaintiff by the defendant on May 17,
1920, since the latter was the result of the former. The court says
it cannot follow the logic of the decision in the case of Earl v. Times-
Mirror Company,78 which holds that "a cause of action for libel on
one day could not be set up as a counterclaim to a cause of action
for libel arising the next day, even though the second libel was
the result of the first," for in the contemplation of the law they
were entirely separate. How can the connection between the libels
be granted without concluding that they arise out of the same
transaction, asks the writer of. the Mulcahy decision?
There has also been much conflict of opinion as to whether causes
of actions based upon facts occurring at approximately the same
time arose out of the same transaction. This is well illustrated
7 4POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §§ 367-368. To the same effect,
though in different wording, is Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960, 43 L. R. A.
(N. s.) i168 (1912).
75Conner v. Winton, 7 Ind. 523 (1856); Lovejoy v. Robinson, 8 Ind. 399
(1851); Cleveland, C., C & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Partlow, 70 Ind. App. 616, 123
N. E. 838 (i919); Krause v. Greenfield, 6I Ore. 502, 123 Pac. 392, ANN. CAS.
1914B 115 (1912); WORKS, PRACTICE, PLEADING, AND FOPisS (x882) § 667.
7
"Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 40 Ind. App. 26, 8o N. E. 981 (1907);
BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; WILL'S GOULD, PLEADING (1909)
note p. 394; SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (19IO-I917) § X91.
7767 Mont. 9, 214 Pac. 1IO6 (1923).
7sI85 Cal. 165, 195 Pac. 57 (1921).
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by the cases of Harris v. Avery,79 which allowed a joinder of actions
for false imprisonment and slander occurring almost simultaneously,
on the ground that they arose out of the same transaction (there
was no further reasoning), and that of DeWolfe v. Abraham,8 which
is opposed to the view enunciated in Harris v. Avery. The reasons
given for the result in the DeWolfe case are that the natures of the
causes of action *ere different, the evidence to support the claims
would not be similar, and the measure and proof of damages would
be unlike.
Another angle to the meaning of transaction involves mutuality.
As to this, the opinion is unanimous that it must be a two-sided
affair; it must involve at least two persons and not be a mere act
by one party.8' The courts seem to think that a bare statement of
the proposition is sufficient. Though this is true, it should be noted
that the injured party need not be physically present when his
interests are injured.8
And, as a final point to consider in relation to this subject, we
are confronted with the question as to whether or not the plaintiff's
statement of his case forms the limits of any transaction involved.
The answer comes in no uncertain terms that the plaintiff can set
no such boundaries. "It is for the purpose of enabling the court
to render a judgment by which the rights of the parties may be
finally determined in the same action, rather than to compel another
action, that the Code permits a defendant to set up in his answer
any new matter arising out of the transaction set forth in the com-
plaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim; and, if the plaintiff
omits or fails to set forth in his complaint the entire transaction
out of which his claim arose, the defendant may supplement this
omission by s6tting forth in his answer the omitted facts, so that
the entire transaction may be before the court."' And as a practical
715 Kan. 146 (2869). 80151 N. Y. 186, 45 N. E. 455 (1896).
81Konick v. Champneys, lO8 Wash. 35, 283 Pac. 75, 6 A. L. R. 459 (1919);
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) §§ 367-368.
2McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264
(1910).
8Story and Isham Commercial Co. v. Story, 2O Cal. 30, 34 Pac. 671 (1893);
to the same general effect are Excelsior Clay Works v. DeCamp, 4o Ind. App.
26, 80 N. E. 98I (1907); Mulcahy v. Duggan, 67 Mont. 9, 214 Pac. 11o6 (1923);
Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372 (N. Y. 1858); Gross v. Hochstim,
72 Misc. 343, 13o N.Y. Supp. 315 (Sup. Ct., App. Term x911); Advance Thresher
Co. v. Klein, 28 S. D. 177, 133 N. W. 51, L. R. A. 1916C 514 (1911); PATTIsON,
MISSOURI CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1912) § 751; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(5th ed. 1929) § 650; SUTHERLAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 633; (1929)
2 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 315.
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matter it is called to our attention that the defendant's cause of
action, though arising out of the same transaction as that which
was the source of the plaintiff's claim, must state additional facts,
for naturally the plaintiff would not state the facts entitling the
defendant to a judgment against the plaintiff.84
This clear note having been sounded to the effect that the plaintiff
cannot contract the extent of a transaction, we ask whether or not
he may expand it by merely saying that facts are a part thereof.
The answer is "No"."5 The fact situation, not the plaintiff's state-
ment, determines the extent of a transaction.
We next direct our attention to the meaning of the term subject
of the action as it relates to the joinder and counterclaim statutes.
That we may have them well in mind, I repeat their usual forms.
"The plaintiff may unite in the same petition several causes of
action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated
legal or equitable, or both, where they all arise out of: First, the same
transaction or transactions connected with the same subject of action;
* * ** **" "The counterclaim must be * * * * * * * a cause of action
arising out of the contract or transaction pleaded in the complaint, or
connected with the subject of the action." "All persons having an
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded
may be joined as plaintiffs, * * * * *."
Here we find three statutes dealing with different propositions,
and yet meant to be a portion of a general plan of procedure. Should
similar terms in these enactments be defined uniformly? McArthur
v. Moffett,"8 the case presenting the greatest amount of learning
on the joinder of parties statute, says "Yes". One should notice
that it goes even further than this and states that an attempt should
be made to co6rdinate all similar terms in the statutes of a state,
even though they do not all relate to a general subject. Thus the
term subject of the action in the joinder and' counterclaim statutes
should be harmonized with the same term in venue and published
service statutes.
Though not dealing with the meaning of subject of the action,
the decision in Stone v. Case"7 is so closely connected with the prin-
ciple and phrase now under discussion that this seems to be the proper
place to deal with it. It concludes that the word "transaction"
found in a single subdivision of the joinder of causes section has two
8 4WHITTELSEY, MIssouRI PRACTCE (x876) § 192.
'SFlynn v. Bailey, 50 Barb. 73 (N. Y. 1867).
88x43 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264 (1910).
8734 Okla. 5, i24 Pac. 96o, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1168 (1912).
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different meanings. When employed in that part of the statute
allowing one to join all causes of action arising out of the same
transaction, the word means all connected or dependent acts which
constitute one entire system or deal; but when it is used in the
phrase allowing joinder of actions arising out of transactions con-
nected with the subject of the action it means the acts or groups
of acts which constitute a cause of action. This appears to make
"transaction" and "cause of action" synonymous. I find no other
similar case.
Our attention is now turned to the valuable dictionary meanings.
Subject means "a thing over which a right is exercised; 7a that
concerning which anything is said or done; the thing or person
treated of; matter; theme; topic;88 that, which is thought, spoken,
or treated of;89 something that forms a matter of thought, discourse,
investigation, etc."8 " Subject-matter signifies "the matter presented
for consideration in statement or discussion; subject of thought
or study;9 the subject or matter presented for consideration in some
written or oral statement or discussion ;92 the substance of a dis-
course, book, writing or the like, as distinguished from its form
or style; the subject or theme; 3 the matter or thought presented
for consideration;14 the matter in dispute. ' ' 4a Action indicates
"a legal proceeding by which one demands or enforces one's right
in ,a court of justice; a judicial proceeding for the enforcement or
protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a ivrong, or the
punishment of a public offense;5 the taking of legal steps to establish
a claim or obtain judicial remedy; legal process; a legal process or
suit;98 a a proceeding instituted in court by one or more parties
against another or others to enforce a right, or punish or redress
a wrong; 96 a legal proceeding instituted by one person against
another; 97 a suit or process by which a demand is made of a right."918
alMURRAY's NEW OXFORv DICTIONARY.
8 8 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
9 9THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA.
99 THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY.
9iWEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
92THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA.
3THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY.
9 4NUTTALL'S STANDARD PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY.
"aMURRAY'S NEW OXFoRD DICTIONARY.
9 WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
9
aMURRAY'S NEW OXFoRD DICTIONARY.
"THE CENTURY DICTIONARY AND ENCYCLOPEDIA.
9 7 THE NEW CENTURY DICTIONARY.
9 8NUTTALL'S STANDARD PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY.
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As to the legal fraternity's notion of subject of the action, we en-
counter negative and affirmative conclusions, just as we did when
considering transaction.
It is often declared that subject of the action is not synonymous
with cause of action99 or right of action.1"0 Winslow, C. J., in McArthur
v. Moffett"' decides as a reason for this result that to hold that these
terms "mean the same thing is to make nonsense of the whole phrase",
for the different words and phrases used in these acts were intended
to accomplish some definite purpose. "They were not inserted to
fill up space or for rhetorical effect."
Professor Keigwin in his Cases in Code Pleading"'2 decides that
these terms are not similar in meaning because the causes of action
to'be combined are plural and different from each other, while the
subject is single and identical, serving as the tie which connects
various things.
The reasoning in Pomeroy's Code Remedies"'3 is that one can see
this is correct by making the substitution, since the result would
be that "causes of action may be united when they arise out of
transactions connected with the same cause of action." This is an
absurdity, a mere statement in a circle.
This result creates an interest, from the viewpoint of the inter-
pretation of subject of the action, to determine the purport of cause
of action, for once that is done we can subtract it from the possible
conceptions of subject of the action. An additional reason for learning
the meaning of cause of action is, of course, the fact that two of our
statutes speak of joining or counterclaiming causes of action. Courts
and others have tossed off various definitions of "cause of action",
"
9Adams v. Bissell and Noble, 28 Barb. 382 (N. Y. 1858); Rogers v. Wheeler 89,
App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2nd Dept. 1903); Stone v. Case, 34 Okla.
5, 124 Pac. 96o, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1168 (1912), but this court in its decision
proceeds to practically prove that they are synonymous after saying they are
not by saying a cause of action consists of a wrong and a right to redress and
that subject of action consists of the plaintiff's right and its infringement. Mc-
Arthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264 (1910);
BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING
(1926) PP. 437 e setq.; POM!EROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 369; SUTHER-
LAND, CODE PLEADING (1910-1917) § 633; WILL'S GOULD, PLEADING (1909)
P. 3. Bazemore v. Bridges, lO5 N. C. 191, IO S. E. 888 (1890); KINKEAD, LAW
IN CIvIL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2nd ed. 1898) § 8o seem
contra.
100PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (1896) § 197.
101143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. s.) 264 (1910). See to the
same effect, Adams v. Bissell and Noble, 28 Barb. 382 (N. Y. 1858).
1'2pp. 437 et seg.
1§ 369.
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the majority of which, if analyzed carefully, indicate that a cause
of action must include the plaintiff's right, the defendant's cor-
responding duty, and the latter's breach of that duty.0 4 In this
connection the United States Supreme Court in Baltimore S. S. Co.
v. Phillips,104a says that "a cause of action does not consist of facts,
but of.the unlawful violation of a right which the facts show." If
these authorities are correct, subject of the action cannot be the sum
of the plaintiff's right, the defendant's duty, and a breach thereof.
But in recent years there has been some very thorough, interesting,
and valuable work done in which this doctrine has been questioned.
Dean Clark in an article entitled The Cause of Actiono4b declares
that the phrase "should be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts
which give rise to one or more relations of right-duty between
two or more persons. The size of such aggregate should be worked
out in each case pragmatically with an idea of securing convenient
and efficient dispatch of trial business."
In reply to this article Professor McCaskill'c claims that a "cause
of action" is that group of operative facts which, standing alone,
would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that
right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief
to the party or parties whose rights are invaded. The singleness of
the right and delict is determined by a study of the old remedies
in connection with which the concepts as to singleness of rights
and delicts developed. The relief sought characterizes the cause
of action and the nature and scope of the action cannot be determined
without a consideration of the relief sought."
Thus, a particular set of facts, which, under Dean Clark's idea,
would give rise to only one cause of action in equity, would be the
foundation of a legal and an equitable cause of action if Professor
McCaskill's solution was applied. The two theories would lead to
different results under the law relating to amendments as it applies
'10 Stone v. Case, 34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) I168 (1912);
Hoag v. Washington Oregon Corporation, 75 Ore. 588, 147 Pac. 756 (1915);
Jenkins v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 84 S. C. 343, 66 S. E. 409 (I9O9); McArthur
v. Moffett, I43 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264 (I9IO); BLISS,
CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932)
§ 187; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 413; SCHNEIDER, CODE PLEAD-
ING (1926) p. 16; (1929) 2 So. CALIF. REV. 315. Cause of action and claim have
been held to be synonymous. Fulton County Gas and Electric Co. v. Hudson
River Tel. CO., 2o N. Y. 287, 93 N. E. 1052 (1911).
14a274 U. S. 316, 47 Sup. Ct. 600 (1926).
104b( 19 2 4 ) 3 3 YALE L. J. 817; Borchard, Judicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity
(X932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 793, 803, in accord.
2O4Actiens and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614.
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to statutes of limitations and under the law dealing with the doctrine
of res adjudicata.
Soon after the publication of Professor McCaskill's work Dean
Clark replied briefly theretolo4d reasserting his view and claiming
that Professor McCaskill's proposition is "opposed to the ideas and
plans of the code makers".
Professor Gavit 1°4e differs with the two writers just mentioned.
He says "cause of action" cannot refer alone to facts or the codifiers
would have drafted the statute to read that one should state his
cause of action and not to read that he should state the facts con-
stituting it. He decides that a "cause of action" is the specific
substantive right as a matter of substantive law. He says this
substantive right consists of the "facts (which the plaintiff must
plead) plus a rule of law (which he must not plead)". This substan-
tive right he distinguishes from the combination of a primary right, its
correlative duty, and the invasion of the right, or violation of the duty.
Neither, it is said, is subject of the action the object thereof,"'5
for, one writer says, °w a cause of action cannot arise out of transac-
tions connected with the object of the action, because the object
is something in the future, and could have had no being when the
transactions took place out of which the causes of action arose.
As the causes of action arise out of certain transactions, and as the
transactions are connected with a subject of the action, it is plain that
this subject must be in existence simultaneously with the transac-
tions themselves, and prior to the time of the birth of the causes
of action. We should, however, note a strong unreasoned dissent.0 7
'Since, according to some authorities, the object of the action cannot
be the subject of the action, we are forced, if we wish to follow their
ideas, to discover what the former term amounts to, in order that
we may do our taking away. The writers seem clearly to call the
101d( 19 2 5 ) 34 YALE L. J. 879.
l04eThe Code Cause of Action (1930) 30 COL. L. REv. 802.
IHBLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEAD-
ING (1926) pp. 437, et seg.; PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) § 313;
POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 369.
106PoMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 369.
107Lewisohn v. Stoddard, 78 Conn. 575, 63 Atl. 621 (19o6); Hall v. Ayer
'and Lord Tie Co., 31 Ky. L. Rep. 508 (1907); Hooker v. Porter, 173 N. E. 713
(Mass. 1930) City of N. Y. v. Parker Vein S. S. Co., 12 Abb. Pr. 300, 21 N. Y.
Super. Ct. (8 Bosw.) 300, 21 How. Pr. 289 (1861); Palen v. Bushnell, 46 Barb.
24 (N. Y. 1866); Gray v. Rothschild, 48 Hun 596, I N. Y. Supp. 299, 14 Civ.
Proc.- R. 320 (1888); Motley v. Pratt, 13 Misc. 758, 35 N. Y. Supp. 184 (Com.
Pl., 1895). It has also been decided that the demand for relief is the subject of
action. Balfour Quarry Co. v. West Const. Co., 151 N. C. 345,66 S. E. 217 (1909).
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relief demanded the object of the action."" Hence the relief demanded
standing by itself cannot be the subject of the action.
Another negation is that subject of the action and transaction,
already thoroughly discussed, cannot be synonymous. One author-
ity' ° gives as a reason that both words in the statutes were put
there for a reason and each meant a different thing, and to say
they mean the same thing would make nonsense of the statute.
A different interpreter'10 says that the common subject cannot be
a transaction for the transactions are plural and each connected
with the subject as a single and distinct entity.
A final suggestion along this line is that the subject of the action
is not merely the obligation of a contract."' Presumably this amounts
to a statement that subject of the action does not amount to merely
the defendant's duty. No reasoning is given and nothing is said
as to torts.
These are the authorities as to what subject of the action is not.
It is next in order to discover the affirmative holdings. A statement
that is frequently found is that subject of the action and subject-matter
of the action are identical."1 One author's holding is contrary since,
he says, for these terms to be synonymous, it would require the
subject of the action to be common to all the several causes of action
to be joined, while it cannot be common to the causes of action,
but must be common to the several transactions out of which the
several rights of action arise."' One might well expect to gain
"'9BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61; KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEAD-
ING (1926) pp. 437 et seg.; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 364;
(1929) 2 So. CALIF. REV. 315.
09McArthurv. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445,3 L. R. A. (N. s.) 264 (1910).
"'KEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) pp. 437 et seq.
"'Rogers v. Wheeler, 89 App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2nd Dept. 1903).
"'2Morris v. Judkins, 36 Cal. App. 413, 172 Pac. 163 (1918); Shaeffer v. 0. K.
Tool Co., i1O Conn. 528, 148 Atl. 330 (1930); Revere Fire Ins. Co. v. Chamber-
lin, 56 Iowa 508, 8 N. W. 338 (x881); Erskine Heirs v. Gardinez, 118 So. 453
(La. 1928); Shelton v. Harrison, 182 Mo. App. 404, 167 S. W. 634 (1914); Barr
v. Post, 56 Neb. 698, 77 N. W. 123 (1898); Chamboret v. Cagney, io Abb.
Pr. (n. s.) 31, 41 How. Pr. 125, 32 N. Y. Super. Ct. 378 (2 Sweeney, 1870);
Rogers v. Wheeler, 89 App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2nd Dept. 19o3);
Van v. Madden, 132 App. Div. 535, ix6 N. Y. Supp. 1II5 (3rd Dept. 19o9);
Harrison v. Frederick C. Loeser & Co., 164 App. Div. 115, 149 N. Y. Supp.
491 (1914); Tobin v. Smith, I Ohio N. P. 75, io S. and C. P. D. p. 675 (1892);
Wilson v. Hampton, 2 Posey Cas. 426 (Tex. 1882); BOONE, CODE PLEADING
(1885) § 87; GREEN AND MYER, MISSOURI,PRACTICE (1879) § 817; KEIGWIN,
CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) pp. 321 et seq.; POMEROY, CODE REMEDIES
(Sth ed. 1929) § 369.
".PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) § 313.
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considerable aid from the word subject-matter, for it is a term of
common speech. But usually the courts, after identifying that
word with subject of the action, fail to take the next logical step
of defining subject-matter." 4  Rather, they turn back to their
original phrase and struggle with it.
In addition to this line of cases, there are numerous attempts
of legal writers to put their fingers on something definite which
will in all cases be the subject of the action. Let us investigate
this grab bag of ideas and see what we shall find. Subject of the
action is the primary right of the claimant, say some."5  Others
decide that this right alone shall be the subject of the action only
in instances where no tangible property is involved, and even then
there may be a question as to whether or not the right standing
by itself is the subject of action.' Professor Keigwin"7 suggests
that there is a serious objection to identifying subject of action
and the plaintiff's primary right, but does not tell what the objec-
tion is. Phillips,"8 in speaking of joinder of causes, comes to a
like conclusion and gives as his reason that the primary rights are
two degrees removed from each other by the intervention of the
transactions. The rights of action are the product of different
transactions, and the different transactions must be connected
with the subject of action. He does not consider the matter from
the viewpoint of counterclaims. This raises the question as to
whether or not the difference in the form of the counterclaim and
joinder of actions statutes should affect the interpretation of sub-
ject of the action. Notice that in the counterclaim statute it says
the connection involved should be between the plaintiff's cause
of action and the subject of the action, for it states that there may
114For an exceptional case which does consider the meaning of "subject-
matter," see McArthur v. Moffett, I43 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445,33 L. R. A. (N. s.)
264 (1910).
"
3Wild Rice Lumber Co. v. Benson, II4 Minn. 92, 13o N. W. 1 (1911); Price
v. Minnesota, D. & W. Ry. Co., 130 Minn. 229, 153 N. W. 532, ANN. CAS.,
1916C, 267 (i915); Haberle-Crystal Spring Brewing Co. v. Handrahan, ioo Misc.
163, i65 N. Y. Supp. 251 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Braithwaite v. Akin, 3 N. D. 365,
56 N. W. 133 (1893); Clark v. Duncanson, 79 Okla. 18o, 192 Pac. 8o6, i6 A. L. R.
315 (1920); Hurst v. Hannah, 107 Okla. 3, 229 Pac. 163 (1924); Tripp v. City
of Yankton, io S. D. 516, 74 N. W. 447 (1898); Washburn Land Co. v. White
River Lumber Co., i65 Wis. 112, i61 N. W. 547 (1917), but notice that this case
does not involve tangible property; POMEROY, CODE REmEDIES (5th ed. 1929)
§ 65I; WILL'S GOULD, PLEADING (1909) p. 3; (1929) 2 So. CALIF. L. REV. 315.
"
8McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564, 128 N. W. 445, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 264
(1910).
n
7 1IEIGWIN, CASES IN CODE PLEADING (1926) pp. 437 et seg.
"'PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (I896) § 197.
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be a counterclaim arising out of the contract or transaction pleaded
in the complaint or connected with the subject of the action. On
the other hand, the joinder of actions statute says the connection
involved should be between the transactions and the subject of the
action, for it states that actions arising out of transactions con-
nected with the subject of the action may be joined. Although,
as already pointed out,11 9 it has been strongly suggested that the
term means the same thing in the statutes under discussion, the
exact distinction has not, to my knowledge, been specifically pointed
out and discussed. I shall consider it further in a later division
of this paper. It is also declared that the subject of the action is the
plaintiff's claim of right."s0 This probably means the same thing
as his primary right.
I find no cases saying that the subject of the action means the
primary duty of the defendant, but there is one stating that it is
the defendant's duty to indemnify the plaintiff. 20 This may be another
way to express the defendant's primary duty to the plaintiff, but
it properly refers to a duty to do something after a wrong has been
done by the defendants, whereas the primary duty, which is a
duty not to harm the plaintiff, exists prior to the injury. Apparently
the term "duty to make compensation" in chapter 13, section 2A i
of the Contracts Restatement refers to this secondary duty in relation
to contracts. But the term as here used refers to tort, as well as
contract, situations.
Although there seems to be a lack of authorities holding that
the subject of the action is the combination of the primary right
of the plaintiff and duty of the defendant, there is a declaration
that the subject of the action is the plaintiff's right to be indemnified,
and the defendant's duty to indemnify the plaintiff."1 .
A different group has determined that the subject of the action
amounts solely to the defendant's wrong, his infringement of the
plaintiffs right not to be injured."' A. bare conclusion without dis-
ugSupra note 86.
12 0Redwater Land and Canal Co. v. Jones, 27 S. D. 194, 13o N. W. 85 (1911);
GREEN AND MYER, MISSOURI PRACTICE (1879) § 15.
"'aFulton County Gas and Elec. Co. v. Hudson River Tel. Co., 2ooN. Y. 287,
93 N. E. 1052 (1911).
2'Fulton County Gas and Elec. Co. v. Hudson River Tel. Co., 2oo N. Y. 287,
93 N. E. 1052 (1911).
mMoyle v. Porter, 51 Cal. 639 (1877); Boulden v. Thompson, I Cal.'App.
279, 131 Pac. 765 (1913); Armstrong v. Hinds, 8 Minn. 254 (Gil. 221, 1863);
Hay v. Hay, 13 Hun 315 (N. Y. 1878); Grange v. Gilbert, 44 Hun 9, 6 N. Y.
St. Rep. 423 (1885); Lamming v. Galusha, 135 N. Y. 239, 31 N. E. 1024 (1892);
Griffith v. Friendly, 30 Misc. 393, 62 N. Y. Supp. 391 (Sup. Ct. 1899); Bazemore
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cussion is found in these cases. Whether or not the same idea is
intended to be expressed by saying that the subject of the action
is the origin and ground of the plaintiffs right"' is a little difficult
to tell, but, since the judge who seems to have originated the ex-
pression said that the subject of the action did not relate to the
thing about which the controversy arose, he may well have wished
to treat the origin and ground of plaintiff's action as the injury to
the plaintiff by the defendant. The use of this same term by Suther-
land 2 4 is still more confusing, for, after employing it as a synonym
for the subject of the action, which latter expression, he adds, does
not refer to the thing about which the controversy has arisen, he
further declares that the subject of the action may refer to property,
as in an action to set aside a deed, or to the right asserted, as in an
action of trover to recover bills of exchange, in which the right to
possession or the bills themselves may be the subject of the action.
Just what is meant I do not certainly know.
Next our search leads us to a combination of former conceptions,
and we learn that the subject of the action is the plaintiffs primary
right and its infringenent.m Valuable reasoning is found in Stone v.
CaseP6 in which the court says that unless there is a right to be
infringed and an infringement thereof there can be no subject of
the action.
We have dealt with the part that the defendant's acts play in
the subject of the action, and now we find an authority claiming
that the plaintiffs act of bringing a foreclosure action21 is the subject
of the action. There appears to be no other similar offspring of the
legal brain.
Up to this point, the drawings from our grab bag have not pre-
sented any single ideas which have been supported by many authori-
ties, but, as we reach in and take out the propositions dealing with
v. Bridges, 105 N. C. 191, io S. E. 888 (189o); Solomon v. Bates, ix8 N. C.
316,24 S. E. 4 78,54 Am. Dec. 725 (I896);McGowan v. Life Ins. Co.of Va., 141
N. C. 367,54 S. E. 287 (I9O6); Cline v. Southern Ry. Co., 96 S. E. 532 (S. C. 1918).
'"Collier v. Erwin, 3 Mont. 142 (1878); Osmer v. Furey, 32 Mont. 581, 81
Pac. 345 (1905).
'
24CODE PLEADING, § 633.
n5YaiZn v. Garnaas, 27 N. D. 292, 145 N. W. 825 (1914); Stone v. Case, 34
Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 96o, 43 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1168 (1912); Sharum v. Sharum, ioi
Okla. 273, 225 Pac. 682 (1924); Hurst v. Hannah, 107 Okla. 3, 229 Pac. 163
(1924); Brahm v. M. C. Gehl Co., 132 Wis. 674, 112 N. W. 1097 (1907).
1'34 Okla. 5, 124 Pac. 960, 43 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1168 (1912). See also Telulah
Paper Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 132 Wis. 425, 112 N. W. 522 (1907) to the same
effect.
27Tobin v. Smith, I Ohio N. P. 75 (1892).
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tangible property, the situation changes. We do not find unanimity
of opinion, but we get the closest approach to it that exists. Neither,
of course, do we find many authorities giving any reason for their
results, but it is here that we meet the most complete and careful
thinking that there is on the meaning of the term which we are at
the present time discussing.
Probably a majority of writers, including courts, hold that where
tangible realty"1 8 or personalty129 is involved the tangible property
is the subject of the action. Many courts have also determined
that where there is some tangible evidence of the plaintiff's rights,
such as notes or stock certificates, these tangible things are the
subjects of action.130 Bliss may mean the same thing, but he says
128Meyer v. Quiggle, i4o Cal. 495, 74 Pac. 40 (I9O3); Rensberger v. Britton,
31 Colo. 77, 71 Pac. 379 (I9O3); Flint v. Dulany, 37 Kan. 332, I5 Pac. 208 (1887);
Lahiff v. Hennepin County Catholic Building and Loan Ass'n., 6i Minn. 226,
63 N. W. 493 (1895); Barnes v. Gilmore, 6 Civ. Pro. R. 286 (N. Y. 1884); Grange
v. Gilbert, io Civ. Pro. R. 98 (N. Y. 1885); Holmes v. Abbott, 53 Hun 617,
6 N. Y. Supp. 943 (1889); Hynes v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 56 Hun 641,
9 N. Y. Supp. 260 (189o); Corcoran v. Mannering, io App. Div. 516, 41 N. Y.
Supp. 1090, 75 N. Y. St. Rep. 1437 (2nd Dept. 2896); Griffin v. Thomas, 128
N. C. 310,38 S. E. 9o3 (i9oi); Miser v. O'Shea, 37 Ore. 231, 62 Pac. 491, 82 Am.
St. Rep. 751 (I9OO); Gray v. Granger, 48 Wash. 442, 93 Pac. 912 (i9o8); Kruezin-
ski v. Nuendorf, 99 Wis. 264, 74 N. W. 974 (1898); BLISS, CODE PLEADING (3rd
ed. 1894) § 61, or perhaps the realty and title thereto; NASH, PLEADING AND
PRACTICE UNDER THE CIvIL CODE (2nd ed. 1874) pp. 35 et seg.; PHILLIPS, CODE
PLEADING (2nd ed. 1932) § 377; POMEROY, CODE REiEDIES (5th ed. 1929) § 369.
129Craft Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551,
29 Atl. 76, 25 L. R. A. 856 (1893); Lapham v. Osborne, 2o Nev. 68, i8 Pac. 881
(1887); Garner v. Thorn, 56 How. Pr. 452, 6 Abb. N. C. 212, 45 N. Y. Super.
Ct. 148 (2879); Adams v. Loomis, 54 Hun 638, 8 N. Y. Supp. 17 (1889); Ameri-
can Nat. Bank v. Grace, 64 Hun 22, I8 N. Y. Supp. 745 (1892); Marshall v.
Friend, 35 Misc. IOI, 7 N. Y. Supp. 221 (Sup. Ct. I9OI); Rogers v. Wheeler,
89 App. Div. 435, 85 N. Y. Supp. 981 (2nd Dept. 29O3); Carpenter v. Man-
hattan L. Ins. Co., 93 N. Y. 552 (1905); Harrison v. Frederick C. Loeser & Co.,
264 App. Div. 115, i49 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1st Dept. 1914); Scognamillo v. Pas-
sareli, 21o N. Y. 55o, io5 N. E. 199 (1914). See also the same references to
Bliss, Nash, Phillips, and Pomeroy that are found in the note next preceding
this one.
'"Bannerot v. McClure, 39 Colo. 472, 9o Pac. 70, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 126
(1907) (contract); Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 2oI Fed. 617, 120 C. C. A. 45, ANN. CAS. I915A, 637 (I912) (insurance
policy); Sigler v. Hidy, 56 Iowa 504, 9 N. W. 374 (1881) (note); Revere Fire
Ins. Co. v. Chamberlin, 56 Iowa 5o8, 8 N. W. 338 (i88i) (insurance policy);
Miller v. Thayer, 96 Kan. 278, 25o Pac. 537 (1915) (note); Thomson v. Baird's
Ex'rs., 23I Ky. 574, 21 S. W. (2d) 979 (1929) (note); Allen v. Hodge, 32 Ky.
Law Rep. 509 (907) (contract); Fish v. Chase, 114 Minn. 46o, 131 N. W 631.
(i91I) (stock); Xenia Branch Bank v. Lee, 7 Abb. Pr. 372 (N. Y. 1858) -(bills),
but it should be observed this court wavered and said the subject of action might
"SUBJECT OF ACTION"
the subject of the action in such cases is the subject matter of the
contract, its promise, the consideration, and the matter in respect
to which the promise has been made'. A strange result reached by
Pomeroy's Code Remedies should be commented on. In his section
on counterclaims1 2 the author decides that the subject of the action
in all cases is the plaintiff's main primary right, as the right to
possession in ejectment, replevin, trover, and trespass, and the
right to the money in all cases of debt, whereas, in his discussion
of joinder of causes,"' he declares that it is the physical facts, the
things real or personal, the money, lands, chattels, and the like in
relation to which the suit is prosecuted. Why there should be this
difference is not disclosed.
No, lawyers are not unanimous in deciding that, when things
tangible are involved in a case, those things are the subject of action.
Let us proceed further with an investigation of this clash of opinion.
At least three courts have concluded that in such an instance when
title is involved the subject of the action is the title to the property."'
It may be that the same thing is meant by the expression claim of
right,135 but that is not certain.
We shall now find several combination subjects of the action dealing
with things tangible. One of them includes property and the title
thereto when title is in issue. This proposition is sponsored by the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the case of McArthur v. Moffett.-"
This decision is so thoroughly reasoned that it deserves extended
discussion, which should properly come here. The correctness
of its result will be dealt with later. "The court first cuts away some
underbrush by saying that cause of action, transaction, and subject
of the action mean different things and then undertakes to deter-
be the right to possession to the bills; Burns v. Nevins, 27 Barb. 493 (N. Y. 1858);
Barber v. Ellingwood, 137 App. Div. 704, 122 N. Y. Supp. 369 (ist Dept. i91o)
(stock); Fleiss v. Hoy, 15o App. Div. 555, I35 N. Y. Supp. 44 (ist Dept. 1912)
(stock); Stevenson v. Devins, 158 App. Div. 616, 143 N. Y. Supp. 916 (1st
Dept. 1913) (contracts); East Lake Lumber Co. v. Van Gorder, 105 Misc. 704,
169 N. Y. Supp. 266 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (stock); LeClare v. Thibault, 41 Ore. 6oi,
69 Pac. 552 (1902) (note and mortgage); Bush v. Froelick, 66 N. W. 939 (S. D.
x896) (note and trust deed); Closner and Sprague v. Acker, 2oo S. W. 421 (Tex.
Civ. App. I918) (deed); PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (2nd ed, 1932) § 377.
'BLIsS, CODE PLEADING (3rd ed. 1894) § 61.
232§ 65I. ...§ 369.
"
4Stilwell v. Duncan, 103 Ky. 59, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1701, 44 S. W.357, 39 L. R. A.
863 (1898); Davisv. Davis, 9 Mont. 267,23 Pac. 715 (189o); Heggiev. Hill, et al.,
95 N. C. 303 (1886).
13 5Aylesbury Mercantile Co. v. Fitch, 22 Okla. 475, 99 Pac. lO89, 23 L. R. A.
(N. s.) 573 (i9o8).
"'Supra note 114. See also Wille v. Maas, 156 Wis. 274, 145 N. W. 783 (1914).
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mine what subject of the action means. It says one must take into
consideration all statutes in the state whose laws are under discus-
sion and which include in them the term subject of the action. It
then refers to two Wisconsin enactments, one of which provided
that all actions relating to realty had to be tried in the county in
which the subject of the action, or some part thereof was situated.
Of course, the land was the subject of action. Another statute
related to published summonses and stated that where the subject
of the action is real or personal property there might be such a
summons. No one would deny that here again the subject of the
action is the property. From his premise the judge argues that
these statutes clearly show that the subject of the action wherever
found in the statute book in which these laws existed must include
the tangible property, if such property is involved in a litigation.
Moreover, argues the judge, equitable principles were intended to
apply to the joinder and counterclaim acts. Prior to their enactment,
equity treated the property as part of the subject of the action
in suits in which it was involved. Q. E. D. But one can not stop
there. Other cases often arise which deal with no tangible property.
That situation must be cared for. One should, if possible, find some-
thing which is a part of every suit, and one need not go far to do that.
Always the plaintiff must rely on his primary right. Therefore,
to the primary right, which provides a subject of the action for
cases not involving discernible property, add your tangible realty
or personalty and you have a subject of the action when things
tangible are involved. In a dictum the court is not quite sure whether
or not in other instances the primary right shall alone be the subject
of action, but, at any rate, it is an ingredient thereof.
In Bliss on Code Pleading37 the author says that the subject of the
action is the property, or contract and its subject matter, or other
thing involved in the dispute, and, in actions to recover the posses-
sion of land, the realty, and usually its title, are the subjects of the
action. As to why there should be a difference in situations in which
tangible property plays a part so that in some instances the title
thereto should be a part of the subject of the action and in others
it should not, and especially why this distinction should be made
in different actions to recover possession of land, does not appear.
As a forerunner to another multiple subject of action where
tangible property is involved, and there is a question as to who
has rightful possession thereto, we learn that some believe the sub-
ject of the action under such a circumstance is the right to the pos-
'3§ 61.
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session of such property.138 This might also be considered under
the general head of primary right, but a suggestion of the holding
at this point seems more valuable. Following this, we discover
that under such circumstances- this possession coupled with the
title to the property has likewise been understood to make up the
subject of the action."9
Our attention is turned next to cases involving intangibles, in
which the courts treat these imperceptible things much as tangibles
have been dealt with in cases we have but recently examined. They
say that the thing is the subject of the action. To make this clear,
it may be well to give a few concrete examples of the idea. Where
the plaintiff sued for the value of goods sold, the debt was treated
as the subject of the action, 140 and the same result has been reached
though the action was on a note.41 Work has been considered
the subject of the action where suit was brought to recover for
the value of it.'4' In Bliss on Code Pleading'4 we also find some
examples which throw considerable light on the working out of
this theory. It is there said that in actions of libel and slander the
subject of the action is the character or occupation of the plaintiff,
in suits by an employer for an injury to his servant, it is the em-
ployees' service, in proceedings to recover damages for the seduction
of the plaintiff's wife, it is the marital relation. We even find that
in an action for false imprisonment it is the plaintiff's liberty. It
should be observed that in the last case a tangible thing, the plain-
tiff's body, had a place in the facts. A variation of this idea says
the subject of action is the intangible thing as work, and failure to
compensate the plaintiff for it.'"
So far the courts have followed rather narrow limits in defining
subject of action, but our research has finally led us to a broad high-
way, if we take the expression of the decisions now considered at
their face value. I refer to the idea advanced by certain courts
138Long v. Bagwell, 38 Okla. 312 (1913). See Scarborough v. Smith, 18 Kan.
399, 407 where the court says the subject of the action is the right to enjoy the
property.
'
3 Venable v. Dutch, 37 Kan. 515, I5 Pac. 520, I Am. St. Rep. 260 (1887);
Grignon v. Black, 76 Wis. 674, 45 N. W. 122 (1890).
'
4
"Abernathy & Pinegar v. Meyer-Bridges Coffee & Spice Co., 30 Ky. L.
Rep. 844, 99 S. W. 942 (1907); Bonnell v. Wheeler, I Hun 332, 3 T. & C. 557,
16 Abb. Pr. (n. s.) 81 (N. Y. 1874).
"
4Nolle v. Thompson, 6o Ky. 121 (3 Metc. 186o).
"'Biershenk v. Stokes, 18 N. Y. Supp. 854 (Com. Pl. 1892).
14§ 6I.
1
"Lundine v. Callaghan, 82 App. Div. 621, 8x N. Y. Supp. 1052 (2nd Dept.
1903).
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and other lawyers that the subject of the action consists of the facts
constituting the plaintiffs cause of action.14 5 This must, according
to some, make the cause of action and the subject of the action
synonymous, which we have found, is a proposition that many
will not admit is correct.146 Upon a careful reading of these cases
we do not always find that they mean what is said. One example
of this should suffice to illustrate this truth. Hall v. Werneyl 6a
was a proceeding in which the plaintiff sued the defendant for
trespass upon the plaintiff's land which, it was claimed, resulted in
injury to the realty and the crops thereon. The defendant at-
tempted to counterclaim by alleging a right to use the property
as a highway, claiming an interference with that right by the plain-
tiff, and demanding damages therefor. The court said, "The words
'subject of action' mean the facts constituting the plaintiff's cause
of action," and then continued, "The obstruction of the highway
by the plaintiff cannot be said to have arisen out of the subject of
the plaintiff's action, which was the destruction of the plaintiff's
crops, and the injury to his land." Is it not clear that the court
has really made the alleged injury committed by the defendant
the subject of the action? And is it not just as certain that this
alone does not constitute the plaintiff's cause of action? Must
there not exist in addition to the injury a right in the plaintiff not
r
4 1in re Harper, 175 Fed. 412 (D. N. Y. 191o); Chamboret v. Cagney, io Abb.
Pr. (n. s.) 31, 41 How. Pr. 125, 32 N. Y. Super. Ct. 378 (2 Sweeney, 1870);
Leinair v. Griswold, 40 N. Y. Super. Ct. IOO (8 Jon. & S., 1875); Hall v. Werney,
I8 App. Div. 565, 46 N. Y. Supp. 33 (4th Dept. 1897); Sugden v. Magnolia
Metal Co., 58 App. Div. 236, 68 N. Y. Supp. 809, 32 Civ. Pro. R. 18 (xst Dept.
19or); Van v. Madden, 132 App. Div. 535, 116 N. Y. Supp. 1115 (3rd Dept.
I9O9); Adams v. Schwartz, I37 App. Div. 230, 122 N. Y. Supp. 41 (ist Dept.
IgIO); Mulberger v. Koenig, 62 Wis. 558, 22 N. W. 745 (1885); KINKEAD, LAW
IN CiviL ACTIONS AND DEFENSES UNDER THE CODE (2nd ed. 1898) § 8o. Notice
the confusion in BOONE, CODE PLEADING (1885) § 87, when he says that the
qubject of action means subject-matter in dispute or the facts constituting the
the plaintiff's cause of action. It is either property or a violated right. Dean
Clark, in his Handbook on THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING (1928), p. 311, n. 74,
says "subject of the action" means "the subject-matter of the action, permitting
a wide joinder within the limits of trial convenience"; McCaskill, Actions and
Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614, 647, believes the phrase means "the
totality of operative facts, which, determined by the principle of administrative
convenience, can be dealt with in one suit"; Gavit, The Code Cause of Action
(i93o) 30 COL. L. REv. 802, 831-833, 835, suggests that it means the "factual
situation involved in the controversy or probable controversy between the
parties as to the law or facts, or both".
I4 6Supra note 99.
146aI8 App. Div. 565, 46 N. Y. Supp. 33 (4th Dept. 1897).
"SUBJECT OF ACTION"
to be harmed by the defendant, and the corresponding duty of
the defendant not to harm the plaintiff before a cause of action
exists in favor of the plaintiff? Must not facts be alleged by the
plaintiff from which this right and duty can be spelled out before
he can be said to have stated a cause of action? If this is so, the
court here first said the subject of action was the facts constituting
the plaintiff's cause of action and then said it amounted to some-
thing less than that.
In following the story of authority on the meaning of the sub-
ject of the action, we have found utter confusion among the
courts. But that isn't all of the picture, for we discover that same
thing as to different causes of action in single cases decided, naturally,
by the same judge, or set of judges, at one time. In closing the re-
search on the definition of the subject of the action, let us consider
some examples of this mental storm. In Mayerus v. Hoscheid,4 7
the plaintiff sued to recover damages for the conversion of wheat
by the defendant. The latter attempted to counterclaim for breach
of a replevin bond given by the plaintiff who had replevied the
wheat. It was decided that the subject of action in the first case
was the wheat, the tangible thing involved, while in the counter-
claim it was the breach of the replevin bond and the alleged taking
and conversion of the wheat by the plaintiff, that is, the wrong
done by him. Thus in the same case the court in one instance says
the subject of action consists of two different types of things, yet
in both causes of action a tangible thing, the wheat, played a part,
and, if one thinks that the wheat was not involved in the counter-
claim, the replevin bond was available as a thing which could be the
subject of the action, thus making the subjects of action similar
in type. Another instance of this same situation is found in Hulce
v. Thompson." The plaintiff wished to join one action to eject the
defendant from the house and dooryard of a farm and another to
recover damages for trespasses to other parts of his farm. The
court declared that this was impossible, not on the ground that the
causes dealt with different subjects of the action of the same kind,
which might have been logical, but because the types of subjects
of the action were different. In the first cause of action, the subject
of the action, so the court said, was the realty, a tangible thing,
and in the second the trespasses, the wrongs done by the defendant,
14711 Minn. (Gil. I60) 243 (I866).
1489 How. Pr. 113 (1854).
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the infringement of the plaintiff's primary right. And still other
cases of this kind exist. 49t
149Downing v. Wilcox, 84 Conn. 437, So Atl. 288 (19I z); McClelland v. Rlemsen,
14 Abb. Pr. 331, 36 Barb. 622, 23 How. Pr. '75 (1862); Sweet v. Ingerson, 12
How. Pr. 331 (856); American National Bank v. Grace, 64 Hun 22, x8 N. Y.
Supp. 745 (1892); Starr Cash Carrier Co. v. Reinhardt, 2 Misc. i6, 2o N. Y.
Supp. 872 (1892).
tThis is the first instalment of Professor Wheaton's article. The second and
concluding instalment will appear in the February, 1933 issue of THE CORNEL.
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